



Nicola Peart, University of Otago 
discusses R v Collins and its implications in New Zealand 
R v Collins, ex parte S [1998] 3 All ER 673 is a recent decision of the English Court of Appeal, in which patient autonomy was strongly reaffirmed. The ap- 
peal set aside a High Court order which authorised a 
compulsory caesarian section on a pregnant woman against 
her express wishes. The Court of Appeal also granted relief 
by way of judicial review against the respondents in respect 
of their decisions to apply ex parte for the woman’s compul- 
sory admission under the Mental Health Act 1983. 
FACTS 
Ms S was a 29-year-old who became pregnant in September 
1995. She did not seek ante-natal care until 25 April 1996 
when she was approximately 36 weeks pregnant. She then 
registered as a new patient with Dr Chill, a GP, who diag- 
nosed her as suffering from severe pre-eclampsia, a disorder 
of pregnancy which manifests itself in high blood pressure 
with potentially fatal consequences for both mother and 
child. Dr Chill advised immediate admission to hospital and 
an induced delivery, S refused, because she wanted to have 
her baby naturally, in a barn in Wales. She did not care about 
the risks to herself or to her unborn child and thought it 
would be better for the baby if it died. 
Concerned about S’s mental state, Dr Chill called in an 
approved social worker, Miss Collins, and a psychiatric 
Registrar, Dr Jeffreys. They tried to persuade S to go to 
hospital for treatment, but she was adamant in her refusal. 
Miss Collins felt that she had no choice but to detain S “for 
assessment” in accordance with s 2 Mental Health Act 1983. 
Dr Chill and Dr Jeffreys provided the necessary recommen- 
dations. S was admitted to hospital where the seriousness of 
her condition was confirmed. 
S continued to refuse treatment and was advised by a 
solicitor that she was entitled to do so. The hospital made 
an ex parte application to the Family Division of the High 
Court for a declaration authorising a caesarian section. 
Neither S nor her solicitor knew anything about this appli- 
cation, 
The application came before Mrs Justice Hogg on 26 
April. On the basis of the information given to the Judge, 
including the incorrect fact that S had been in labour for 24 
hours, Hogg J granted the declaration within half an hour. 
Later that day, when the foetus became distressed, an emer- 
gency caesarian section was performed and S gave birth to 
a healthy daughter. 
On 30 April S was seen by another psychiatrist who 
found no evidence of mental illness. Her detention was 
terminated. S left hospital alone, rejecting the baby at first, 
but later decided to keep her. 
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THE PROCEEDINGS 
After her discharge S commenced proceedings in public law 
and in private law against the social worker and the Health 
Trusts where she had been treated. Her application for 
judicial review was lodged outside the time limit, but the 
Court of Appeal considered the issues of such public impor- 
tance that it granted leave to move for judicial review. 
([1998] 1 FLR 790) Aware that S was also appealing against 
Hogg J’s declaratory order, the Court took the unusual step 
of joining the two proceedings. 
THE DECISION 
S succeeded in both proceedings. The Court of Appeal was 
critical of virtually every step of the medical and legal 
procedures which had been employed to detain and treat S 
against her express wishes. The main issues of concern were: 
1. the principle of autonomy and its application to preg- 
nant women; 
2. the use of Mental Health legislation, and 
3. the use of ex parte applications for medical or surgical 
treatment. 
The autonomy principle 
The Court of Appeal reiterated the fundamental principle 
that an adult of sound mind is entitled to refuse medical 
treatment even when his or her own life depends on it. This 
principle applies equally to competent pregnant women: 
In our judgment while pregnancy increases the personal 
responsibilities of a woman it does not diminish her 
entitlement to decide whether or not to undergo medical 
treatment. Although human, and protected in a number 
of different ways . . . . an unborn child is not a separate 
person from its mother. Its need for medical assistance 
does not prevail over her rights. She is entitled not to be 
forced to submit to an invasion of her body against her 
will, whether her own life or that of her unborn child 
depends on it. Her right is not reduced or diminished 
merely because her decision to exercise it may appear 
morally repugnant. (p 692) 
Unless there was a lawful justification, such as incompe- 
tence, as was the case in re MB [1997]2 FLR 426, the 
compulsory caesarian section infringed S’s autonomy. 
The Mental Health Act 1983 
The Court found that S was not incompetent. Her capacity 
to consent was intact. Her thinking process was unusual, 
even apparently bizarre and irrational, and contrary to the 
views of the overwhelming majority, but the Mental Health 
Act could not be deployed to detain people against their will 
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on those grounds. (p 692) She was detained to treat her 
physical condition, not her mental disorder. In fact she never 
received any treatment for her mental condition. The appli- 
cation under the Mental Health Act was therefore unlawful 
and S’s autonomy was infringed. 
The ex parte application 
The Court found the procedure before Hogg J “so extraor- 
dinary and unfortunate” that it felt bound to restate some 
fairly elementary points about declaratory relief, and pro- 
vide guidelines for the future. (p 699) It was particularly 
concerned by the fact that these proceedings had been taken 
ex parte and without full investigation of the merits. 
The Court condemned the use of ex parte applications 
in these sort of cases, because they are unjust and any 
resulting declaration would not achieve its purpose. S had 
not been given notice of the proceedings nor an opportunity 
to be heard and she was therefore not bound by the order. 
Moreover, the application did not fully and frankly 
disclose all the material facts. Hogg J was told that S was in 
labour when she was not, and was not told that S’s capacity 
appeared intact, that she had contacted a solicitor and that 
she had no knowledge of the application. The appeal was 
allowed and the order was set aside. The caesarian section 
thus constituted a trespass, rendering the respondents liable 
to a claim for damages. 
THE NEW ZEALAND SCENE 
It seems unlikely that a case like R v  Collins would occur in 
New Zealand today. The right of a competent adult to refuse 
medical treatment is also part of our common law, but it is 
reinforced by s 11 NZ Bill of Rights Act (1990) and Right 
7(7) Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers 
Rights. (Code of Rights.) Besides, the considerable attention 
given to patient rights since the Cartwright Inquiry in 1988 
can leave few health professionals in doubt about the im- 
portance of patient autonomy. 
The application of this right to pregnant women has not 
been judicially tested here, but it seems unlikely that their 
right to refuse treatment will be curtailed in the interests of 
their unborn children. R v Collins reaffirms that a foetus has 
no separate existence from its mother. The mother’s auton- 
omy is determinative until the child is born alive. To accord 
a foetus rights which restrict the mother’s autonomy creates 
fundamental moral and legal problems. It is a slippery slope 
with no obvious stopping point. 
To go down this slope is nonetheless tempting, particu- 
larly when the foetus is viable. A woman’s refusal of common 
treatment in such circumstances seems morally repugnant. 
Courts overseas have occasionally succumbed to this temp- 
tation and overridden the mother’s right to refuse treatment 
in the interests of the unborn child. (England: Re S [I9931 
1 FLR 26; US:]efferson v  Griffin Spalding County Hospital 
Authority [1981] 274 s 2d 457; In re Madyyun [1986] 573 
A 2d 1259; Canada: Schulman J in Winnipeg Child and 
Family Services Ltd v  DFG [1996] 10 WWR 95 (QB).) 
However, they have generally reverted to the principle 
of patient autonomy, finding no rational or morally accept- 
able basis upon which to limit this fundamental right of 
competent adults. In the light of this experience, it seems 
improbable that a New Zealand Court would override a 
competent woman’s refusal of treatment, no matter what the 
consequences to the woman or her unborn child. 
The New Zealand Mental Health (Compulsory Assess- 
ment and Treatment) Act 1992 is similar to the English Act. 
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Its purpose is to treat a person’s mental condition, not her 
physical condition. If the competence of a person with a 
physical illness is in question an application under the 
Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act, or under the 
parens patriae jurisdiction, would be possible, though nei- 
ther will succeed if the person merely has unusual views. 
Even if her competence were diminished by a mental disor- 
der, she would still retain the right to give informed consent 
to treatment to the extent of her competence. (Right 7(3) 
Code of Rights) The principle of autonomy is thus exten- 
sively protected in New Zealand. 
REMEDIES 
Health professionals in New Zealand may be treated less 
sympathetically than their peers were in England. If a case 
like R v Collins were to arise here, the most likely course of 
action would be a complaint to the Health and Disability 
Commissioner alleging a breach of the Code of Rights. The 
complaints procedure is laid down in Right 10 of the Code 
and in Part IV of the Health and Disability Commissioner 
Act (1994). It is a cheap and simple procedure potentially 
culminating in a hearing before the Complaints Tribunal. 
(s 45) The Tribunal has the power to grant one or more of 
a range of remedies, including an award of damages. (ss 54 
and 57) However, as the performance of an unlawful cae- 
sarean section would constitute a medical misadventure 
under s 5(6) Accident, Rehabilitation, Compensation and 
Insurance Act 1993, the Tribunal would have no power to 
award compensatory damages. (s 52(2) H&DC Act) 
Punitive damages would still be a possibility. Section 
52(2) Health and Disability Commissioner Act expressly 
provides for this if the conduct of the health provider was 
“in flagrant disregard of the rights of the aggrieved person”. 
(s 57(l)(d) H&DC Act.) The Court in R v  Collins com- 
mented that this was not a case where such an award would 
be appropriate. The respondents were all motivated by a 
genuine desire to do what was best for S and her unborn 
child in extremely difficult circumstances. (p 694) Such a 
benevolent view may be less likely in New Zealand. 
A breach of the Code of Rights may also be referred to 
the relevant health professional body for disciplinary action. 
(s 45 H&DC Act) Doctors who claim that a woman was 
incompetent to refuse treatment in the face of clear evidence 
to the contrary may well be disciplined by the Medical 
Disciplinary Tribunal. 
Criminal prosecution is another option. The perform- 
ance of a caesarean section against the patient’s express 
wishes is an offence against the person. A charge of wound- 
ing or injuring with intent (ss 188 and 189 Crimes Act) may 
be difficult to defend under ss 61 and 61A Crimes Act, 
because the operation would have been unreasonable in the 
light of the woman’s express refusal. However, given the 
range of alternative proceedings already described, a crimi- 
nal prosecution would seem to serve little purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
While a case like R II Collins seems unlikely in New Zealand, 
it is nonetheless a salutary warning to health professionals 
that no matter how unreasonable patients’ decisions may 
be, their right to refuse medical treatment is sacrosanct 
unless they lack the necessary competence at the time of 
making that decision. Any attempt to interfere unlawfully 
with that right may result in legal and disciplinary action 
which is considerably less forgiving than the Court of Appeal 
was in R v Collins. a 
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